Indonesia Table of Contents
In its preamble, the 1945 constitution sets forth the Pancasila as
the embodiment of basic principles of an independent Indonesian state.
These five principles were announced by Sukarno in a speech known as
"The Birth of the Pancasila," which he gave to the
Independence Preparatory Committee on June 1, 1945. In brief, and in the
order given in the constitution, the Pancasila principles are: belief in
one supreme God; humanitarianism; nationalism expressed in the unity of
Indonesia; consultative democracy; and social justice. Sukarno"s
statement of the Pancasila, while simple in form, resulted from a
complex and sophisticated appreciation of the ideological needs of the
new nation. In contrast to Muslim nationalists who insisted on an
Islamic identity for the new state, the framers of the Pancasila
insisted on a culturally neutral identity, compatible with democratic or
Marxist ideologies, and overarching the vast cultural differences of the
heterogeneous population. Like the national language-- Bahasa Indonesia
--which Sukarno also promoted, the Pancasila did not come from any
particular ethnic group and was intended to define the basic values for
an "Indonesian" political culture.
While the Pancasila has its modern aspect, Sukarno presented it in
terms of a traditional Indonesian society in which the nation parallels
an idealized village in which society is egalitarian, the economy is
organized on the basis of mutual self-help (gotong royong), and
decision making is by consensus (musyawarah-mufakat). In
Sukarno"s version of the Pancasila, political and social dissidence
constituted deviant behavior. Suharto modified this view, to the extent
that one of the criticisms of his version of the Pancasila was that he
tried to Javanize it by asserting that the fundamental building block of
the Pancasila was the ilmu kasunyatan (highest wisdom) that
comes from the practices of kebatinan.
One reason why both Sukarno and Suharto were successful in using the
Pancasila to support their authority, despite their very different
policy orientations, was the generalized nature of the principles of the
Pancasila. The Pancasila was less successful as a unifying concept when
leadership tried to give it policy content. For example, in 1959 Sukarno
proclaimed a new unity in an important slogan called Nasakom--a state
trinity of nationalism, communism, and religion--as the revolutionary
basis for a "just and prosperous society." To oppose the PKI,
under this model, was to be anti-Pancasila. However, the principal
opponent to this kind of ideological correctness was ABRI, creating
political problems for Sukarno within the military. Suharto, on the
other hand, gained the support of the military because he did not
require ideological conformity. ABRI, while not necessarily actively
promoting the Pancasila, shared rather than contended for power. Suharto
noted this cooperation in his National Day address of August 16, 1984,
when he said that ABRI, with its dual function, was "a force which
preserves and continuously refreshes Pancasila democracy."
Unlike Sukarno, whose use of ideological appeals often seemed to be a
cynical and manipulative substitute for substantive achievements, even
at times an excuse for policy failure, the Suharto government sought to
engage in policies and practices that contributed to stability and
development. The 1973 reorganization of political parties--from the nine
(plus Golkar) that contested the 1971 elections to two (plus
Golkar)--was justified as a step in the direction of Pancasila
democracy. Beginning in 1978, a national indoctrination program was
undertaken to inculcate Pancasila values in all citizens, especially
school children and civil servants. From an abstract statement of
national goals, the Pancasila was now used as an instrument of social
and political control. To oppose the government was to oppose the
Pancasila. To oppose the Pancasila was to oppose the foundation of the
state. The effort to force conformity to the government"s interpretation
of Pancasila ideological correctness was not without controversy. Two
issues in particular persistently tested the limits of the government"s
tolerance of alternative or even competitive systems of political
thought. The first issue was the position of religion, especially Islam;
the second issue was the role of legal opposition in Pancasila
democracy.
From the very outset of independence, Islam and the Indonesian state
had a tense political relationship. The Pancasila"s promotion of
monotheism is a religiously neutral and tolerant statement that equates
Islam with the other religious systems: Christianity, Buddhism, and
Hindu-Balinese beliefs. However, the Muslim political forces had felt
betrayed since signing the 1949 Jakarta Charter, under which they
accepted a pluralist republic in return for agreement that the state
would be based upon belief in one God with Muslims obligated to follow
the sharia. The government"s failure to follow through constitutionally
and legally on this commitment set the agenda for future Islamic
politics. At the extreme was the Darul Islam rebellion of the 1950s,
that sought to establish a Muslim theocracy.
The New Order"s emphasis on the Pancasila was viewed by orthodox
Muslim groups as an effort to subordinate Islam to a secular state
ideology, even a "civil religion" manipulated by a regime
inherently biased against the full expression of Muslim life. Indeed, in
1985 the government capped its effort to domesticate all elements in
society to the Pancasila with legislation requiring all voluntary
organizations to adopt the Pancasila as their sole ideological
principle, and providing for government supervision, intervention, and,
if necessary, dissolution of organizations to guarantee compliance.
Proclaimed as a "perfection" of Pancasila democracy, the Mass
Organizations Law"s intent went to the heart of religiously based
groups. This decision was forced on the Muslim-oriented PPP at its 1984
national congress, which was stage-managed by the government. For some
Muslims it was the last straw. The government"s assurance that Muslims
were not threatened by the law seemed hollow because the new law
restricted the practices of Islam to family, mosque, and prayer, rather
than allowing Islam to enfold the fullness of human activity, including
politics. An environment was exacerbated in which more radical Muslims,
incited by fiery clerics, prepared for direct opposition, including
political violence. The government"s stern reaction to dissidence--swift
arrest, trial for subversion, and long prison terms--soon inhibited any
open public interest in confrontation.
On the other hand, by the 1980s, within the legal and politically
acceptable boundaries of Muslim involvement, the state had become a
major promoter of Islamic institutions. The government even subsidized
numerous Muslim community activities. Within the overall value structure
of the Pancasila, Islamic moral teaching and personal codes of conduct
balanced the materialism inherent in secular economic development.
Suharto himself went to great lengths to demonstrate that he was a good
Muslim, including making the hajj to Mecca in May 1991. In August 1991,
he pledged Rp3 billion to a new Islamic bank (Bank Muamalat Indonesia)
and declared he would encourage other wealthy Muslims to contribute. By
wooing Islamic leaders and teachers, the state won broad support for its
developmental policies. There is no question but that Islam was a
state-favored religion in Indonesia, but it was not a state religion.
Nor, if the New Order prevails over the long term, will it be. That
reality defined the most critical political issue for many orthodox
Muslims. Moreover, the question remained how opposition--religious or
secular--could legally be expressed in the workings of Pancasila
democracy.
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Source: U.S. Library of Congress
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